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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue*
In the interest of conserving the resources of the United Nations and its tribunals,
and in view of tribunal completion strategies, the ICTR can impose limits on the parties
to reduce the length of their cases, limit cross-examination, and impose a date certain for
the completion of trial. This paper examines international precedent and provides a
comparative analysis of how certain domestic courts tackle the conservation issue. This
paper will also briefly touch on some of the components of the ICTY and ICTR
completion strategies, and explore some of the ways in which Tribunals may speed up the
process of completion.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The transferal of Tribunal cases to competent national courts via
Rule 11 bis is an integral part of both the ICTY and ICTR
completion strategies and presents a feasible approach toward
fulfilling the mandates of the Tribunals.

By transferring ICTR cases to other jurisdictions, the Tribunal may be able to
clear most of its docket by 2010, in accordance with the UN mandate. Consequently,
there are many complicating factors that make the option of transfer via Rule 11 bis a less
favorable one than the other strategies discussed hereinafter.

2. Two feasible strategies for speeding up the overall trial process are
to impose various limitations on the parties’ preliminary motions,
and to develop various mechanisms to expedite the pre-trial phase.
3.

Imposing limitations on both the length and style of crossexamination during trial can speed up the overall trial proceedings
while maintaining fairness to all parties.
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In Article 19 of the ICTR Statute the standard for Commencement and conduct of
trial proceedings is stated: “The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure
and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses.” The section in this memo regarding crossexamination will discuss how this mandate can be fulfilled while still reducing the length
of cross examination to ensure that no party is lingering too long on one particular issue
at the expense of moving the trial along at a reasonable pace.
4. Plea Bargaining can be a way to facilitate a speedy trial by giving
the defendant the option of a sentence or charge bargain.
Trials at the ICTR tend to be lengthy because of their complexity in criminal
counts and the high number of witnesses often involved. Plea bargaining presents an
opportunity to streamline cases and speed up the trial process without sacrificing justice.1
The prosecution is given some discretion as to what a feasible sentence for the defendant
would look like, and then the chambers has the ability to adjust the sentence accordingly.

5. Judicial Notice is a way for Trial Chambers to reduce the length of
their cases.
Taking judicial notice of something means that the matter is taken by the court as
established beyond any dispute and not requiring any proof. If the chambers takes
judicial notice of a key fact or evidentiary finding, the trial process will be hastened
enormously because that fact will no longer have to be proven during trial.

1

Nancy Amoury Combs, “Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes,”
151 Penn. L. Rev. 1, at 107 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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6. Factual Stipulations are another tool that could shorten the length
of trials by getting as much evidence on to the table as soon as
possible.
In order to avoid prolonged testimony of multiple witnesses that usually slows
down the trial proceedings, the parties could enter into factual stipulations resolving
certain issues that are the subject of litigation. Factual stipulations are useful because
they serve to quickly dismiss potential disputes that might arise in proving certain facts
where evidence is either so overwhelming that no one could deny the truth, or so sparse
that both parties will have to concede on a particular fact anyway.

7. The “Rocket Docket” delay reduction strategies of civil courts in
the United States provide applicable strategies toward expediting
the trial process at International Tribunals, and increasing
judicial authority.
Rocket dockets can be particularly effective in reducing the length of the pre-trial
phase.2 By limiting preparation time, and imposing early trial dates, attorneys are, in a
sense, forced to prioritize their litigation efforts. Thus, Rocket Dockets provide counsel
with incentive to develop more efficient litigation strategies.3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Since the inception of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)
(together, “Tribunals”), efforts have been taken to significantly improve the tribunals’

2

Carrie E. Johnson, “Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation,” 85 Calif. L. Rev.
225, 243 (1997). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

3

Id.

9

overall efficiency and legitimacy.4 The adoption of detailed and frequently-amended
completion strategies by the Tribunals was seen as a necessary step toward the eventual
conclusion of their mandates. The plan to fulfill the mandate of the ICTY was articulated
in 2002 by then-President of the ICTY, Claude Jorda.5 This plan had two main foci. The
first was to conduct trials involving "the highest-ranking political, military, paramilitary
and civilian leaders,” and the second main objective was to refer certain cases to
competent national courts, to lighten the Tribunal’s load.6 This innovation eventually led
to the development of a plan by the ICTY (in June of 2002) followed by the ICTR to
complete their mandates by 2010.7 Since that time, each presiding President of the ICTY
and ICTR have given yearly reports to the UN Security Council regarding each
Tribunals’ progress and new ideas for and amendments to their respective completion
strategies.
Subsequent to the presentation of the tribunals’ initial completion strategies, the
UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1503 and 1534. Security Council Resolution
1503 particularly emphasized the duty of States in the Balkans and Eastern region of

* In the interest of conserving Tribunal resources (and in view of Tribunal completion strategies),
what concrete limits can a Trial Chamber put on the parties to reduce the length of their cases, limit
cross examination, and impose a date certain for completion of trial—keeping in mind that these are
complex cases with witnesses from around the globe?
4

Daryl A. Mundis, “The Judicial Effects of the ‘Completion Strategies’ on the Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals,” 99 A.J.I.L. 142, at 142 (January, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 10].
5

Judge Claude Jorda, “Address to the United Nations Security Council,” ICTY Press Release
JDH/PIS/690-e, at 1 (July 23, 2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

6

Id.

7

President Claude Jorda, “Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts,” UN Doc.
S/2002/678 (Oct. 2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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Africa to aid the Tribunals in their completion strategies by improving cooperation and
apprehending at-large persons indicted by the ICTY and ICTR.8 The UN Security
Council also urged the ICTR to formulate a detailed plan (similar to that of the ICTY) for
the transfer of cases to competent national courts, including those of Rwanda.9
Resolution 1534, adopted in March of 2004 set forth several new requirements both for
the Tribunal presidents and other leadership, and sharpened the goals of Resolution 1503.
The resolution urged prosecutors to review their respective caseloads to determine which
cases should be kept on the Tribunal docket and which should be transferred to
competent national jurisdictions.10
Despite these positive steps toward efficiency in the trial proceedings of the
tribunals and progress toward ultimate completion, still there have been many
complications. First and foremost, the total cost of operating both tribunals since their
inception has reached more than $ 1 billion. From the establishment of the ICTY through
the budget for 2005, the ICTY alone cost $629,777,722 to operate.11 Both Tribunals have
received criticism internationally for the slowness of trial proceedings, and the seemingly
endless docket of cases and indicted people at large that have yet to be found and tried.
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

8

UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

9

“The Judicial Effects of the ‘Completion Strategies’ on the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals,” at 144, Supra, note 1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

10

UN Security Council Resolution 1534, note 7, para. 4 (2004) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].
11

“The Judicial Effects of the ‘Completion Strategies’ on the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals,” at 144, Supra, note 1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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In lieu of the struggle of the ICTR to implement its completion strategy and move
the numerous case dockets along, this memo will explore some ways in which these goals
can be accomplished.
A. Transferal of Tribunal Cases to National Courts via Rule 11 Bis
Two amendments to the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence [“Rules”] were
made in 2002 and 2004 permitting the Chambers to order that cases be referred to the
authorities of another competent national jurisdiction should the need arise.12 Rule 11 bis
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) If an indictment has been confirmed, irrespective of whether or not the accused is
in the custody of the tribunal, the President may appoint a Trial Chamber for the
purpose of referring a case to the authorities of a State:
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such
a case, so that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate
court for trial within that State.
(B) The Trial Chamber may order such referral proprio motu, or at the request of the
Prosecutor, after having given to the Prosecutor, and, where applicable, the accused,
the opportunity to be heard and after being satisfied that the accused will receive a
fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.
(C) In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the
Trial Chamber shall, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1534 (2004),
consider the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the
accused.
....
(F) At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this Rule and before the
accused is found guilty or acquitted by a national court, the Trial Chamber may, at the
request of the Prosecutor and upon having given to the State authorities concerned the
opportunity to be heard, revoke the order and make a formal request for deferral.

12

See ICTR Press Briefing, ICTR/INFO-9-13-22 (July 8, 2002) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 13].
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Additionally, Rule 11 bis does not indicate whether or not the accused may make
an application for referral of his or her case to national courts. The deliberations of the
judges at plenary sessions (where rules are adopted or amended in accordance with
Article 15 of the ICTY Statute) are not available to the public, thus there is no "legislative
history" of the Rules that would help the interpretation.13
Concerning the transfer of ICTY cases, the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
authorized to apply the law of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has jurisdiction over three
categories of war crimes cases: (1) those referred from the ICTY pursuant to Rule 11 bis;
(2) investigations dossiers deferred by the ICTY Prosecutor for which no indictment has
been issued; and (3) "Rules of the Road" cases pending before domestic courts but which,
due to their sensitivity, should be tried at the State Court level.14 It is of utmost
importance that the national courts to which the ICTY and ICTR seek to transfer cases
have the requisite resources to undertake these important trials, which will be discussed
further along in this memo.
Any trial chamber appointed under Rule 11 bis will have to address two major
questions: (1) whether the case meets the seniority criterion of UN Security Council
Resolution 1534, and (2) whether any states are eligible to receive the case, including
whether or not there is a suitable national court to try the case in the domestic

13

Id.

14

Daryl A. Mundis, “Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals:
Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?” 28 Fordham Int'l L.J. 591, at 595 (2005) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

13

jurisdiction.15 What is of particular concern in referring a case for trial outside the
nearest regions is that by forgoing the holding of trials in the territory where the crimes
were committed, the local population probably most directly affected is not engaged in
the trial process. Some scholars have argued that if the local populations do not
experience or observe the international justice that is being done for the atrocities that
occurred in their own localities, it will negate the legitimacy of the tribunals.16
One of the first examples of the ICTY deciding a Rule 11 bis referral was the case
of Prosecutor v. Gojoko Jankovic which was referred to the government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to be tried there. In considering the Defense’s subsequent appeal to the
decision, the Referral Bench examined the three part standard of Rule 11 bis, UN
Security Resolution 1534, the gravity of the crimes with which the Appellant is charged,
and the level of his responsibility as charged in the Indictment.17 The Referral Bench was
satisfied that based “on the information presently available,” the Appellant would receive
a fair trial and that the death penalty would not be imposed or carried out, thus in
accordance with international standards. The Referral Bench held that the referral was
appropriate and concluded that referral of the case to the authorities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina should be ordered.18

15

Larry D. Johnson, “Closing an International Criminal Tribunal while Maintaining International
Human Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity,” 99 A.J.I.L.158, at 169 (2005) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
16

Id. at 170.

17

The Prosecutor v. Gojoko Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23, “Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral” (15
November 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16] .
18

Id. at para. 77.
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As of June, 2006, six ICTY accused have been referred to the Special War Crimes
Chamber and two accused have been referred to Croatia for trial before its domestic
courts.19 If all of the pending motions are successfully referred under Rule 11bis, 10
cases involving 16 accused will have been removed from the tribunal’s docket in 2006.
However, no other cases are “earmarked” for referral as they do not involve intermediate
or lower level accused persons.20
The first attempt by the ICTR’s Office of the Prosecutor in 2006 to transfer an
accused to a the national jurisdiction of Norway via Rule 11bis failed.21 It was the
decision of a court of first instance, confirmed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR, to
deny the transfer of Michel Bagaragaza to Norway for trial, because Norway’s criminal
code did not specifically foresee the crime of genocide, for which Bagaragaza was
charged.22 The Bagaragaza case was most likely not one of the “low priority” cases that
should have been considered for transfer, primarily because Bagaragaza was a very high
profile politician at the time of the genocide, as Director-General of the government
office that controlled the largest industry in Rwanda at the time – the tea industry.23 On
the other hand, during the presentation of his report last June before the Security Council,
19

President Judge Fausto Pocar, “Statement to the Security Council,” The Hague, (June 2006).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
20

Id.

21

Alhagi Marong, “The ICTR Appeals Chamber Dismisses the Prosecutor’s Appeal to Transfer
Michel Bagaragaza for Trial to Norway,” The American Society of International Law, Vol. 10, Issue
25, p.2 (October 2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
22

Hirondell News Agency, “TPIR/Norway – Former Head of the Tea Trade Will not be Judged by
Norway, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has Confirmed,” www.hirondell.org (August, 2006) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
23

Alhagi Marong, “The ICTR Appeals Chamber Dismisses the Prosecutor’s Appeal to Transfer
Michel Bagaragaza for Trial to Norway,” at 3 (October 2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 18].
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the Gambian head prosecutor of the ICTR - Hassan Bubacar Jallow – criticized the
Bagaragaza decision, arguing that the dismissal of the Rule11 bis request was likely to
discourage other countries until then agreeing to receive ICTR cases.24
The difficulties presented in the transference of cases from the tribunals to
national courts are serious, as the strategy of Rule 11 bis transferals is among the
tribunals’ top strategies toward completion. However, despite the Bagaragaza decision,
the Norwegian Court of Justice may be able to accept “lower” priority transfers from the
ICTR, especially persons accused of lesser crimes than genocide, such as complicity in
homicide. The Norwegian Court would be able to accept these transfers because the code
of criminal law foresees these crimes, and could proscribe an appropriate sentence. The
Court would be able to sentence someone accused of complicity in homicide for up to 21
years in prison, which is the maximum sentence possible in Norway.25
It appears that if an accused from the ICTR were transferred to a court in Norway,
the accused might have broader “rights” by some standards than those being tried by the
ICTR, however, overall the rights appear to be analogous. First, according to the
Norwegian Criminal Procedures Act the accused must be given the chance to refute the
grounds on which the charge brought against him is based.26 In addition, in Norway, the
accused has the right to bring appeals against court verdicts, both questions of fact and
questions of law. For example, appeals to the Supreme Court can only take place if
24

Hirondelle News Agency, “Rwanda: ICTR Confronted with the Difficulty of Transfers,”
www.AllAfrica.com (October 2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
25

Norweigan Penal Code: The World Fact book of Criminal Justice Systems: Norway, Section 15
(Revised July 22, 1997) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjnor.txt [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
26

Id.

16

approved by the Court’s Appeals Selection Committee, the Kjoerem Lsutvalget, and such
appeals can only be based on alleged errors of law, so the Supreme Court is “unable to try
questions of evidence related to the issue of guilt.” 27 Another difference is that in
Norway, the accused might have a right to have his case tried by a jury. Cases involving
appeals from verdicts reached by the court of first instance concerning felonies
punishable by more than 6 years imprisonment (which most of the cases coming from the
ICTR would be), are triable by a jury.28
Indeed, Rule 11 bis transfers of defendants from the ICTR to the jurisdiction of
Norway are possible, if the defendant has been indicted for “lesser” charges than
genocide. Courts in Norway would be able to facilitate the trying of ICTR defendants
accused of crimes adequately punishable by a sentence of 21 years or less. However,
besides Norway, there are jurisdictions with Criminal Codes that have incorporated
genocide provisions. Canada is one such jurisdiction.
The Criminal Code of Canada has two relevant provisions, Section 318:
Advocating Genocide, and Section 319(1): Public Incitement of Hatred.
First, the Code defines genocide as:
Any acts committed with intent to destroy an identifiable group —such as killing
members of the group, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to
bring about the group’s physical destruction.29

27

Id.

28

Id; Should Norway deny the transfer of an ICTR accused to its court on grounds of national security
interests, the Criminal Procedures Act provides for the accused to be entirely excluded from the
proceedings, in order to protect national security interests. However, this provision could obviously
be grounds for an appeal due to the fact of the right of ICTR accused to confront their accusers.
29

Media Awareness Network, “Criminal Code of Canada: Hate Provisions,” (2006) www.mediaawareness.ca [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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Additionally, Section 318 of the Criminal Code of Canada defines the crime for
“Advocating Genocide” as:
The criminal act of "advocating genocide" is defined as supporting or arguing for
the killing of members of an "identifiable group" — persons distinguished by
their colour, race, religion or ethnic origin. The intention or motivation would be
the destruction of members of the targeted group. Any person who promotes
genocide is guilty of an indictable offence, and liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years. 30
Likewise, Section 319(1) of the Code defines “Public Incitement of Hatred” as
having four main elements. All four of these elements must be proven before an accused
will be found guilty of public incitement of hatred: (1) communicating statements either
by telephone, broadcasting, or other audible and visual means; (2) in a public place; (3) to
incite hatred against an identifiable group; (4) in such a way that there will likely be a
breach of the peace.31 The similarity in the Criminal Code of Canada and the ICTR
Statutes’ genocide provisions cures the deficiency found by the ICTR in Bagaragaza.
The provisions of 318 and 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code are one example of a

30
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jurisdiction that would have the capacity in its laws and/or statutes to accept the transferal
of tribunal cases.
1. Potential Problems and Pitfalls with the Transferal of Cases Via
Rule 11 bis.
It is important to note that while the transferal of ICTY and ICTR cases to
national jurisdictions via Rule 11 bis may speed up the completion process of the
tribunals, there are potential problems that may arise with this strategy. Both Canada and
Norway, discussed above as potential options for transferal of cases, (whether or not they
would actually agree is beyond the scope of this work) have at least ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Second Optional,
Protocol, and thus could give assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed.32
However, there is the possibility that inconsistencies that could arise in case law.
Though Canada’s Criminal Code contains provisions for trying genocide, the way
in which Canadian courts would go about this tedious trial procedure could produce
different precedent than those cases that are tried at the ICTY or ICTR, thus creating the
potential for inconsistencies in international criminal law. However, it is arguable that
the potential for small, procedural inconsistencies in case law is a meager price to pay,
when compared to the prospect of transferring ICTR cases to other jurisdictions to lighten
the tribunal’s load.
B. The Musema Trial – an Example of Efficiency
To meet the challenges presented by the completion strategies, tribunal judges
must take measures to improve their trial procedures and speed up cases without
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sacrificing the rights of the parties to a fair trial. One example of an abnormally speedy
trial was the case of Alfred Musema, which began in January of 1999. The Musema case
is the first case to benefit from an application of the changes to the tribunal’s procedures
adopted during the Fifty-Fourth General Assembly session, and designed to accelerate the
pace of trials at the tribunal.33
The Musema trial lasted for only six months, with judgment delivered by the
Trial Chamber within a year of commencement of trial.34 Musema was alleged to have
planned and participated in the killings of Tutsi men, women and children and, in concert
with others, raped and killed women in the area of Bisesero in Gisovu and Gishyita
Communes, Kibuye Prefecture. He was arrested in Switzerland and on 6 May 1999
pleaded not guilty to three new charges of rape included in the amended indictment he
had initially been served with.35
Judges at the ICTR have stated that the main reason for trial delays can be
procedural, that the ICTR trials could never go as fast as criminal proceedings would in a
national jurisdiction.36 This is because in national jurisdictions, the judges have complete
control over procedures whereas at the ICTR, because procedures are based on common
law, they are lengthier, and parties tend to drag their feet more in terms of deadlines.
However, in the Musema case, it appears that the parties were quick to bring forth the
various components of their cases, as the trial commenced in January of 1999 and the
33
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parties made their closing arguments in June.37 Though the minutes of the Musema trial
are not published, from the Summary it is known that both parties presented extensive
evidence including 30 witnesses and 182 documents. Still, the trial proceedings were
substantially quicker than other cases.
One recommendation that could be made considering the Musema trial is that
parties can bring a substantially lesser number of witnesses and still effectively prove
their case. Musema was indicted on nine different counts including:
Count 1 - Genocide & Count 2 - Complicity in Genocide
Count 3 - Conspiracy to Commit Genocide
Count 4 - Crime against Humanity (murder)
Count 5 - Crime against Humanity (extermination)
Count 6 - Crime against Humanity (other inhumane acts)
Count 7 - Crime against Humanity (rape)
Counts 8 and 9 -Violation of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II 274.38
Despite all of these counts, the Prosecution was still effective in proving their case
with a minimal amount of witnesses and trial time. Judge Kama, one of the judges
presiding over the Musema case stated in a report that “judges . . . should be firmer and
put more emphasis on speeding things up.”39 Judge Kama offered insight into why the
trial process can drag along slowly at times, saying that certain lawyers submit too many
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motions and appeals that sometimes slow things down unnecessarily. In particular, Judge
Kama reproached the Office of the Prosecutor for, at times, asking to amend certain
indictments at the last moment, and for not respecting time limits on disclosure of
evidence to the Defense.40
Finally, the President of the ICTY, Judge Fausto Pocar made a similar
recommendation in his statement to the UN Security Council on June of 2006.41 He
assured the Security Council that the Trial Chambers are increasing efficiency of the trial
proceedings, first by shortening the Prosecution’s case by determining the number of
witnesses the Prosecution may call.42 Pocar also stated that the Trial Chambers were
seeking to limit the time available for the presentation of evidence.43 These are principles
that appear to have been utilized by the Prosecution in the ICTR Musema case to speed
up the trial process.
C. Limiting Preliminary Motions and Speeding up the Pre-Trial Phase
Another way to speed up the trial process would be to limit preliminary-type
motions, such as motions to regulate the sequence or location in which depositions are
taken. Another option would be to institute an overall page limit to restrict the aggregate
length of motions and oppositions to motions that could be filed in a case. Defense
counsel personnel are continuously accused of slowing down the court by continued
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excessive use of motions.44 The expert group assigned by the Security council to analyze
this matter concluded that judges should come up with a rule requiring the parties to
discuss any motion prior to its being filed, with a view to resolving the matter between
them.45 This is known as the "omnibus hearing" process for the effective management of
motions prior to trial. Before the omnibus hearing, the parties would discuss contentious
issues and attempt to resolve as many as possible without judicial intervention.46 At the
hearing, each side would have a "checklist motion" presenting their various grounds for
relief. Other grounds that should have been raised but were not raised at the Omnibus
would be waived. The trial chamber would then determine which motions require
evidentiary hearings and would schedule such hearings as soon as possible.
The ICTY Statute states in Article 19 the standard for Commencement and
conduct of trial proceedings: “The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure
and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses.”
Pocar, in his June 2006 statement to the Security Council spoke about increasing
the efficiency of the pre-trial process. First, a policy has been put into place whereby all
pre-trial cases are transferred to the Trial Chamber that will hear the trial at the earliest
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possible stage. In this way, the Pre-Trial Judge and the Pre-Trial staff already familiar
with the case will also serve on the trial and thus facilitate more efficient proceedings.
On May 30, 2006, at the second plenary of the Judges of the Tribunal, an
amendment was adopted to Rule 73 bis of the Rules with regard to indictments. Because
of the intricacy and extent of the indictments this can lead to a drawn out presentation of
the parties’ cases. Previous efforts by the judges to change this pleading practice had
been fairly unsuccessful. 47 However, under the Rule 73 bis amendment, Trial Chambers
now have the explicit ability, at the pre-trial stage, to invite the Prosecution to reduce the
number of counts charged, or to direct the Prosecution to select a smaller number of
counts on which the trial should proceed. This amendment follows common practice in
national jurisdictions of avoiding overloaded indictments to protect the integrity of the
proceedings.48
Pocar also acknowledged that substantial steps are being taken by pre-trial Judges to
more proactively manage and focus pre-trial proceedings to ensure trial readiness and
shorten the overall length of trials. Specifically, pre-trial Judges are:
•

•

•

Establishing work-plans of the parties’ obligations at trial with strict timetables
for presenting their cases and ensuring a strict implementation of such workplans;
Requiring the Prosecution to, at an earlier stage, specify its trial strategy, submit a
focused pre-trial brief, and produce the final statements of all Prosecution
witnesses to be called at trial;
Obliging the Defense to make timely submission of a focused pre-trial brief and
disclosure of expert testimony in order to identify points of agreement and
disagreement between the parties; and
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•

Making greater use of the power to sanction a party for failure to comply with
disclosure obligations.49

Additionally, judges of the tribunal were recently convened in another extraordinary
plenary on 13 September 2006 to adopt amendments to the Rules incorporating those
proposals. That plenary led to the adoption by the Judges of two new provisions, Rules
92 ter and 92 quater.50 In essence, the amendments have increased the ability of Trial
Chambers to consider written statements and transcripts of witnesses in lieu of oral
testimony where that evidence goes to the acts and conducts of an accused. Trial
Chambers are now empowered to decide whether a witness should appear for crossexamination when written statements or transcripts are used, and to allow the admission
of written evidence of witnesses who are not available to attend as witnesses at the
tribunal.

Practical implementation of all of the aforementioned pre-trial and trial-stage steps to
speed up the overall trial process, is noted in the following ICTY cases: In Prlić et al.
and Milutinović et al. The assigning of a pre-trial judge to each case who would also be
assigned to the trial stage resulted in the reduction of the anticipated length of trial by at
least one-third and one-half respectively.51 In addition, in these cases the Trial Chambers
have placed restrictions on the amount of evidence that may be adduced in relation to
some of the counts in the indictments. Furthermore, limitations have been placed on the

49

President Judge Fausto Pocar, “Statement to the Security Council,” The Hague, (June 2006).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
50

Id.

51

President Judge Fausto Pocar, “Address to the General Assembly,” The Hague (9 October 2006).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

25

time allowed for each accused to conduct their cross-examination. In the Šešelj case,
while the Trial Chamber is examining the indictment for purposes of reducing its scope
by one-third, it has invited the Prosecutor to make proposals for that purpose.

1. Possible Limitations to Methods of Cross-Examination

Another way in which tribunals could potentially speed up the trial process would
be to impose limitations on the parties’ ability to cross-examine the witnesses. The rules
and cases governing the rules of cross-examination in the jurisdictions of Western
Australia and Germany are explored in this section,

a. Western Australia

Section 41 of the Uniform Evidence Acts of 1995 grants the court the power to
disallow improper questions asked in cross-examination. The section reads as follows:

(1) The court may disallow a question put to a witness in cross-examination, or
inform the witness that it need not be answered, if the question is:
(a) misleading, or
(b) unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive
or repetitive.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the
purposes of subsection (1), the court is to take into account:
(a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the witness,
including age, personality and education, and
(b) any mental, intellectual or physical disability to which the
witness is or appears to be subject.52
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The duty of the court to intervene in cross-examination has existed since 1995 within
section 42(3) of the Evidence Act, which requires the Court to “disallow the question, or
direct the witness not to answer it, if the court is satisfied that the facts concerned would
be better ascertained if leading questions were not used.”53

The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, in its “Review of the
Criminal and Civil Justice System” explored the limits of examination and crossexamination.54 It explored the issue of whether or not Western Australian judges and
magistrates have sufficient power to intervene in examination and cross-examination
where appropriate. Section 25 of the Evidence Act of 1906 provides for intervention to
limit cross-examination:
(1) to relevant matters;
(2) to matters that are not indecent or scandalous even if these have some bearing
but are not directly at issue; or
(3) so as to exclude matters which are needlessly offensive.
Under the Western Australian Rules of the Supreme Court, there is also a specific
provision for judicial control over the time spent in trial in relation to a number of
matters, including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In deciding these
limits, Order 34 rule 5A requires a judge to consider a number of factors, including:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

53

reasonableness;
fairness;
the degree of complexity of the case;
the number of witnesses;
the state of the Court lists; and
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(6) the importance of the issues and case as a whole.55
These limitations provide for the reduction of misleading, unduly annoying,
harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or repetitive cross-examination.

b. Other Forms of Cross-Examination

In Germany, during trial, the witness will offer his or her applicable testimony in
his or her own words and subsequently, the court will ask questions designed to test,
clarify, and amplify it.56 After that, counsel is permitted to ask extremely pertinent
questions of the witness. However, in an ordinary case there is relatively little
questioning by counsel for the parties, at least by common law standards.57 One reason is
that the judge will normally have asked all of the pertinent questions before counsel is
given the chance. Additionally, for counsel to examine a witness at length after the judges
have seemingly exhausted the witness might appear to imply that the court does not know
its business, which is a dubious tactic.58

In Germany, there is no cross-examination in the sense of the common law, nor is
there a full stenographic transcript of the testimony. Instead, the judge himself pauses
from time to time to say aloud a summary of what the witness has said so far.59 At the
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close of testimony the clerk will read back the dictated summary in full, and either
witness or counsel may carefully suggest improvements in the wording, again placing a
burden on counsel to not offend the court. If the phrasing of a certain part of the
testimony is believed to be of critical importance, counsel may insist on having it set
down verbatim in the minutes, again with fear and trepidation, placing more control into
the hands of the judges.

However, with this alternative method to cross-examination arranged to expedite
the proceedings, there is always room for error. For example, the technique of inviting
the witness to tell his story in narrative form and without general interruption provides an
incentive, in the interest of presenting a conclusive, coherent, and convincing story, to fill
in gaps by half-truths or fiction.60

Additionally, the ICTR already has similar provisions for this kind of judicial
intervention and power. Evidentiary matters at trial are governed by Rule 85(B) which
states that "a Judge may at any stage put any question to the witness." As for the
recommendation that judges be permitted to "ask counsel for either party whether there is
any dispute about a particular piece of evidence," this practice already exists. The
exclusion of irrelevant or repetitive testimony and of witnesses whose testimony is
cumulative or of no material assistance regarding disputed matters can be achieved under
the current rules of evidence without any further amendments. Rule 90(G), for example,
permits a trial chamber to "exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to avoid needless consumption of time." Other
60
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rules, including those governing pretrial conferences, clearly establish a system that
enables the trial chambers to reduce the number of witnesses that either party proposes to
call at trial.
D. The Use of Various Forms of Plea Bargaining to Facilitate Fair and
Expeditious Trials
1. Overview of Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is one of the most favorable options for reducing the length of
trials at international tribunals.61 At the ICTR, one senior official from the Office of the
Prosecutor noted: "The second largest cause of delay in my humble opinion is the failure
to facilitate guilty pleas, which now results in trials of every accused as well as the loss of
potential 'insider' witnesses who could otherwise strengthen the cases and therefore speed
them up."62 Trials at the ICTR tend to be lengthy because of their complexity in
criminal counts and the high number of witnesses often involved. Plea bargaining
presents an opportunity to streamline cases and speed up the trial process without
sacrificing justice.63
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Though the original Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the tribunals did not
explicitly provide for plea bargaining, today both the ICTY and ICTR permit plea
bargaining.64 Case law at the ICTY has discussed whether or not a guilty plea can be a
mitigating factor in a sentence.65 The Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, which was decided in
1997, laid the foundation to what is now Rule 62 bis.66 Rule 62 bis states that, for a
guilty plea to be valid the tribunal must ensure that:
(1) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;
(2) the guilty plea is informed;
(3) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and
(4) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the defendant’s
participation in it. . .
In addition, the ICTR has the requirements of what constitutes a guilty plea
embedded in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, therefore making it simpler to
facilitate such guilty pleas.67 According to ICTR Rule 62(B), if a defendant is to plead
guilty, the tribunal must be sure that the plea:
(1) is made freely and voluntarily;
(2) is an informed plea;
(3) is unequivocal; and
(4) is based on sufficient facts for the crime and defendant’s participation in it,
either on the basis of independent indicia or of lack of any material
disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case.
2. Sentence Bargaining and Discounts
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Despite efforts by ICTR Trial Chambers and prosecutors to motivate various
defendants to plead guilty, considerably few actually do. Some scholars have argued that
sentencing discounts play an insignificant role in guilty-plea decisions in certain groups
of international defendants, especially defendants at the ICTR, whereas at the ICTY,
defendants are more likely to enter into plea bargaining.68 This is because at the ICTY,
defendants tend to esteem sentence reduction more than they esteem getting the chance to
“set the record straight,” as to their culpability regarding the genocide. By contrast, at the
ICTR, studies have shown that defendants are less likely to be influenced by the prospect
of sentence reduction, because they gain a larger degree of utility from having their
“take” on the genocide heard and properly understood.69 In addition, some defendants
strongly feel that certain witnesses may be lying and feel compelled to set the record
straight. Thus, to more effectively convince ICTR defendants that plea bargaining and
sentence bargaining are good options, the ICTR should incorporate inducements beyond
the promise of sentence reduction alone.70
During sentence bargaining, parties engage in negotiations concerning the
sentence that will be imposed upon the defendant if trial were to continue, or
alternatively, if the defendant were to plead guilty.71 The prosecutor usually agrees to
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recommend to the Chambers one specific sentence or a small range of sentences.72 In
jurisdictions where sentence bargaining is practiced, courts typically sentence in
accordance with prosecutorial recommendations.
Whether or not sentence bargaining will inspire defendants to plead guilty
depends on a variety of factors including: (1) the nature of the crime allegedly
committed; (2) the nature of the sentence recommended by the Prosecution; (3) the
background and motivations of defense counsel, (4) the political and social status of the
Defendants, and (5) the Defendants’ cultural views about the genocide, the crime and its
suitable punishment.73
3. Charge Bargaining
Charge bargaining involves negotiations regarding the specific charges in the
indictment to which the defendant will plead guilty. During charge bargaining, the
prosecutor typically agrees to dismiss certain charges, often the most grave, with the
expectation that the defendant will receive a lower sentence as a result. Charge
bargaining is most helpful where the criminal code classifies criminal activity into
carefully delineated, distinct crimes; and constrains judicial sentencing discretion by
setting forth presumptive sentencing ranges for particular crimes.74 Charge bargaining is
often very helpful in places like the United States were a crime of murder is subdivided
into multiple categories of severity and sentence prescriptions, therefore defendants are
fairly assured of their potential sentences should they go through the trial process. As a
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result some postulate that 90% of criminal cases in the United States involve plea
bargains.75
Charge bargaining arguably loses some effectiveness when applied to
international crimes, because tribunals’ criminal codes define certain crimes more
broadly, and some of the crimes encompass a broad range of behavior. Genocide and
crimes against humanity constitute some of the core offenses over which the tribunals
have jurisdiction and each of these crimes can be committed in a plethora of ways.76 One
of the crimes against humanity, persecution, may be committed by murder,
extermination, or torture, “however the crime of persecution can also encompass
arguably lesser crimes.”77 Consequently, two defendants convicted of persecution may
have engaged in vastly different criminal behavior, yet still run the risk of receiving
similar sentences.
To utilize one short example from the ICTY, General Blaskic was a military
commander convicted for the crime of persecution for having ordered "attacks on towns
and villages; murder and serious bodily injury; the destruction and plunder of property . .
. inhuman and cruel treatment of civilians and, in particular, their being taken hostage
and used as human shields; [and] the forcible transfer of civilians." By contrast, another
defendant, Dragan Kolund, who was a lowly shift commander in a prison camp having
“only a limited ability to prevent the mistreatment of prisoners or to improve the
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conditions in which prisoners were held. . . [he himself] did not mistreat anyone; rather,
his conviction of persecution stemmed from his continuing to act as a shift commander
despite the abuse that others perpetrated on prisoners and the appalling conditions
prevailing at the camp.”78 Therefore, two defendants accused of the same crime arguably
have vastly different levels of culpability. Consequently, it is more difficult for counsel
to motivate defendants to plead guilty at the ICTR, because certain crimes encompass a
very wide spectrum of activity, but are not formally divided into degrees of severity to be
applied to a defendant’s sentence.79 Charge bargaining could be more effective in the
international criminal context if the prosecution is willing to withdraw charges in a way
that would fundamentally alter either the legal or the factual description of the
defendant’s alleged criminal conduct.
4. The Judges’ Role in the Sentencing Process
The statutes and procedural rules of the ICTR instruct judges to take into account
many factors when sentencing, including the gravity of the offense and the individual
circumstances of the defendant, the general practice regarding prison sentences in the
courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that might influence the proposed duration of the sentence.80 Incidentally,
the statutes and the rules do not provide any instruction as to the relative "gravity" of the
various offenses within the Tribunals' jurisdictions.81
78

Id. at 78.

79

Id.

80

ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence R. No. 101(B)(ii) [reproduced in accompanying notbook at
Tab 8].
81

Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law
Sentencing, 87 Va. L. Rev. 415, 420 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35].

35

To date, only five defendants at the ICTR have pleaded guilty.82 One reason why
plea bargaining is relatively rare at the ICTR could be because defendants no longer have
sufficient certainty that they will receive the sentencing discounts for which they
bargained. In the past, defendants have counted on the prosecution's recommendation to
the trial chamber to define the outer limit of their possible sentence. Plea bargaining
proves to be an effective means of motivating defendants when the chambers is not
forced to impose a sentence longer than that which the prosecution has recommended. It
is arguable that when prosecutors offer only modest concessions to defendants pleading
guilty; Trial Chambers are more likely to accommodate those recommendations, or even
prescribe a lesser sentence than was recommended by the prosecution. However, when
sentence recommendations are far more lenient, as they have been in the past two years,
some Trial Chambers decline to sentence in accordance with them, which in turn can
have a negative effect on the whole bargaining system.83 Thus, it is advisable that the
prosecution prescribe reasonable sentences that have been previously approved by the
trial chambers in similar cases. This way, defendants can have a higher degree of
certainty the type of sentence that they will receive.
E. Judicial Notice
Scholars have struggled with the fact that sometimes, the prospect of sentence
reductions carries little persuasive value for ICTR defendants. Rather, these defendants
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place greater weight on a variety of ideological factors.84 Many ICTR defendants have
refused to plead guilty because they truly do not believe that they are guilty of the crimes
for which they have been charged, and desire a chance to have their side of the story
heard.
Until June of 2006, a number of ICTR defendants still denied that genocide even
occurred in Rwanda, maintaining instead that the conflict in 1994 happened because of a
long-running war between the Rwandan government and the RPF.85 While ICTR
defendants often concede that events spiraled out of control and violence was, in fact,
targeted against Tutsi civilians, they still maintain that this violence constituted the
excesses of “a legitimate national defense effort, not a genocidal plan to eliminate the
Tutsi.”86 Taking judicial notice of a certain disputed matters such as the occurrence of
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 would mean that the fact of genocide would be taken as
established beyond any dispute and not requiring any proof. Judicial notice of the
genocide did indeed take place in June of 2006. The ICTR Appeals Chamber ruled in the
trial of The Prosecutor v. Karemera that the all trial chambers must take judicial notice of
the following facts:

(1)
(2)

The existence of Twa, Tutsi and Hutu as protected groups falling under the
Genocide Convention;
The following state of affairs existed in Rwanda between 6 April 1994 to 17 July
1994: there were throughout Rwanda widespread or systematic attacks against a
civilian population based on Tutsi ethnic identification. During the attacks, some
Rwandan citizens killed or caused serious bodily or mental harm to person[s]
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(3)

perceived to be Tutsi. As a result of the attacks, there were a large number of
deaths of persons of Tutsi ethnic identity;
Between 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994 there was genocide in Rwanda against
Tutsi ethnic group.87

Judicial notice is an incredible way to speed up trial proceedings because it serves to
eliminate the time it takes to prove certain large and complex concepts, such as genocide,
again and again. Judicial notice could be taken of many of the events that took place in
Rwanda that have already been proven in cases that have already rendered judgments.
F. Factual Stipulations
Like judicial notice, factual stipulations are another tool that could shorten the
length of trials by getting as much evidence on to the table up front as possible. In order
to avoid prolonged testimony of multiple witnesses that usually slows down the trial
proceedings, the parties could enter into factual stipulations resolving certain issues that
are the subject of litigation.88 A stipulation of fact is conclusive, “precluding withdrawal
or further dispute by a party joining in the stipulation after the stipulation is accepted.”89
Factual stipulations by the parties should be allowed in order to speed up the trial process
and avoid unnecessary disputes, however stipulations need to be fully representative of
the facts of the offence.90

87

ICTR Press Release, “ICTR Appeals Chamber Takes Judicial Notice of Genocide in Rwanda”
ICTR/INFO-9-2-481.EN (June 2006). http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2006/481.htm
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36]; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and
Nzirorera, ICTR-98-44-AR73 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37 ].
88

The United States National Labor Relations Board, “Factual Stipulations,” NLRB Database (2001)
http://b08983web2001.wdc1.attens.net/nlrb/legal/manuals/hog9.htm, [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 38].
89

Id.

90

The Law Reform Commission, “Consultation Paper on Sentencing,” (Ireland: March 1993),
http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/lrc74/lrc_74.html [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 39].

38

One example of a case at the ICTY where factual stipulations were utilized was
The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic & Mario Cerkez.91 In Dario, though the prosecution
initially proposed that roughly 370 witnesses would be needed to prove their case, they
opined that if the parties could come up with factual stipulations that were “less
argumentative,” and this would aid the court in moving forward at a faster pace. 92
However, the prosecution also argued that it can be difficult to stipulate potential exhibits
without ruining the flow of the prosecution’s case.93 While factual stipulations may aid
in speeding up the trial process, they also have the potential to take away from a
prosecutor’s overall trial plan of proving the defendant’s culpability in stages. However,
factual stipulations are one of the best ways that both parties can speed up the trial
process, because they serve to quickly dismiss possible disputes that could arise in
proving certain facts where evidence is either so overwhelming that no one could deny
the truth, or so sparse that both parties will have to concede on a particular fact anyway.
E. The “Rocket Docket” Delay Reduction Strategies of Civil Courts in the
United States and Their Applicability to Speeding up the Trial Process at
Tribunals

Rule 1 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that the
rules of trial procedure be "construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."94 However, some U.S. scholars cite the
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pretrial discovery phase as one of the principal reasons for the high cost and delay of trial
proceedings.95 A 1991 study of litigation problems, conducted by the President's Council
on Competitiveness, concluded that "over 80% of the time and cost of a typical lawsuit
involves the pre-trial examination of facts through discovery."96
Some argue that individual judges should rely on an inherent power model to
justify their procedural decisions.97 Under this model, judges should derive decisionmaking authority not only from textual sources, but from the history and politics of the
judiciary as an institution. American case law reveals that docket management falls
squarely within a judge's inherent power.98 The Second Circuit court of Appeals,
explained that, "since the trial judge must be entrusted with the power to alleviate
calendar congestion, we shall not put obstacles in his way when he exercises his
judgment wisely in achieving the desired goal."99 Thus the tribunal judges should be
given more authority under the inherent power of the judiciary found in jurisdictions such
as the U.S., to speed up their case dockets, forcing parties to stricter deadlines to submit
pre-trial evidentiary findings and amendments to the indictment.
Rocket dockets can be particularly effective in reducing agency costs, litigation
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costs and external costs.100 By limiting preparation time, and imposing early trial dates,
attorneys are, in a sense, forced to prioritize their litigation efforts. This incentive to
develop efficient litigation strategies helps control the “common dilatory tactic of filing
numerous peripheral motions to harass opponents.”101 In addition, “rocket dockets” can
protect misinformed clients from over-discovery by their own attorneys. This is because
“rocket dockets” force attorneys to create streamlined discovery plans that better reflect
the compressed timeline, and to narrow the areas of inquiry for those that are truly
relevant.102 In this way, tribunal lawyers might also limit the amount of witnesses that
they will call to the stand, as earlier discussed.
Potential Pitfalls: Disadvantages of “Rocket Dockets”
Although “rocket dockets” are intended to persuade attorneys to streamline their
discovery plans, limited preparation time may actually prevent an attorney from carefully
considering their discovery strategy, including what evidence is likely to be found.
Attorneys may end up haphazardly filing too many motions, in an effort to beat the
clock.103 An earlier trial date imposed by the judge may force a party to prioritize various
arguments without adequate time to consider optimal litigation strategies. The
subsequent strict refusal to continue a trial date when a party realizes that its rushed
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discovery choices were unwise or inadequate will force parties to abandon uninvestigated
issues.104
Another potential pitfall of rocket dockets is that by selecting earlier trial dates
than normal with little party input, judges may effectively reduce a party's process
control, therefore decreasing a party’s concept of procedural fairness.105 In addition,
some litigants highly value the opportunity to express themselves in their preparation
concerns, and speeding up the court docket might take away from this. However, the
ends of speeding up the trial process might justify the means of taking away some of the
parties’ process control.
If the priority of a speedy trial operates to prevent reasonable discovery, “rocket
dockets” may also effectively exacerbate appellate-level congestion. Judge-imposed
schedules that limit pretrial investigation may decrease the legitimacy of trial outcomes in
the eyes of either party, and as a result, more verdicts could be likely to be challenged.106
A recent case from the Central District of California illustrates both the
administration and potential dangers of a “rocket docket.” In Martel v. County of Los
Angeles, Martel filed a civil rights action against the County of Los Angeles, relating to
some injuries incurred during a physical struggle with the police.107 Two days later, the
district judge issued a standing order describing his court's "rocket docket" scheduling
procedure: "This court strives to set trial dates as early as possible and does not approve
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of protracted discovery. Counsel should expect the case to go to trial within three months
of the filing of the first answer.”108 The order emphasized that "continuances are rarely
granted . . . The Court sets firm trial dates and will not change them except for
emergencies." Four days before the pretrial conference, Martel moved for a continuance
of the trial date for time to conduct additional discovery due to the fact that he had only
just them found an additional defendant. The district court denied the motion, and the
jury found for the Defendants.
The Ninth Circuit eventually denied Martel’s appeal of the lower court’s denial of
his motion for a continuance, saying that the denial did not result in “actual and
substantial prejudice."109 However, this case demonstrates the problems that might arise
given the strictness of some court’s “rocket dockets.” A way to mitigate the potential
unfairness that parties’ might complain of would be to set a similar “substantial
prejudice” standard that must be met by a party to receive a continuance or extension. In
the Martel case, the plaintiff only moved for a continuance because an additional
defendant was discovered that substantially altered his case. In tribunal proceedings, a
party could move for an extension if they could prove a similar “substantial prejudice”
threshold.
IV. CONCLUSION
Indeed, there are numerous ways in which the trial chamber can be empowered to
regulate both the prosecution and defense, such that frivolous motions, evidentiary
overload, and quarrels between the parties can be resolved in a manner that is fair and
expeditious.
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